

City of Roseville
Westfield Galleria Arson
After-Action Report

Executive Summary

On Thursday, Oct. 21, 2010, Roseville's police and fire departments coordinated operations to overcome an array of unprecedented and potentially lethal challenges presented at the Westfield Galleria at Roseville shopping mall.

Essentially, these challenges were:

- A suspect believed to be armed and carrying an explosive device inside a large and regionally popular retail destination;
- A fire started by the same subject, who barricaded himself inside a store;
- The need to protect lives — as the highest priority — by resolution of the explosive device threat, while preserving the ability of fire department personnel to safely extinguish a rapidly spreading fire that threatened massive property damage; and
- Conducting fire operations in and around an approximately 1.4 million square foot, multiple-story building while avoiding danger to personnel from imminent structural collapse.

Meeting these challenges, without loss of life, required close communication between both departments, as well as with multiple agencies responding to the scene. Overall, this was accomplished. However, as with virtually any emergency response, important lessons were learned that will greatly improve each department's ability to successfully respond to, engage and resolve future emergencies requiring both fire department and law enforcement expertise.

This executive summary outlines the events of Oct. 21 and reviews the most important lessons learned from the resolution of the Westfield Galleria at Roseville arson fire.

Response:

At 10:22 a.m. on October 21, Roseville's public safety dispatchers were notified of an arson fire at the GameStop video games store, on the second floor of the Westfield Galleria at Roseville. They were told that a suspect had entered the store, mentioned a gun, displayed a backpack that smelled of kerosene, and barricaded himself inside the storage room to the rear of the store, where he started a fire. The first Roseville Police and Roseville Fire Department units arrived on scene six minutes after they were dispatched.

Engagement:

Roseville police began operations outside the GameStop entrance. The suspect remained at large and was believed armed. Soon, law enforcement became aware of the possibility of an explosive device, which created a significant threat to the public and police and fire personnel. A sprinkler system for that area of the Galleria had been activated. Both the police and fire departments quickly established perimeters around the scene of the fire's origin at GameStop.

It was later learned that for a 71-minute period, the sprinklers in the area of the fire scene were deactivated. It was unknown to Roseville police and fire officials that any sprinklers had been turned off until about 11:41 a.m., when Fire Department personnel in the Galleria Fire Control Room heard a Westfield maintenance worker talking about having been told to shut off one of the fire sprinkler valves. In response to their direct question, he stated that the "police department" had told him to do so. Fire Department personnel told him that the sprinkler valve needed to be turned back on immediately, and initiated communications to accomplish that task. Within eight minutes, SWAT team escorted the Westfield maintenance worker to the water valves to accomplish that task at 11:49 a.m.

It was later determined that the Westfield maintenance worker turned off the sprinklers in the affected zone at 10:38 a.m. In later interviews, the maintenance worker said the request came from either a police officer or sheriff's deputy who was stationed outside the GameStop. However, no sheriff deputies were present at that time and no police officer made such a request. Subsequent interviews identified a UPS employee also telling a Westfield maintenance worker that the police wanted the sprinklers turned off, however neither the UPS worker nor the maintenance worker could recall or identify who initiated the request. The sprinklers remained off until Fire Command discovered the situation and immediately ordered them back on. Later review of sprinkler records would determine the sprinklers had been off for 71 minutes during the initial stages of the incident.

Officers located the suspect in a back hallway of the mall, and took him into custody at about 12:11 p.m. Items he took into the store were not found, and the police department was concerned he had left an explosive device inside the mall, creating an ongoing threat to firefighters and police officers.

Effectively attacking the fire without undue risk to firefighters hinged on removing the suspected explosive device as a threat. The fire had now grown immensely in the attic space above GameStop and adjacent stores. Coordinating with firefighters, the police department deployed robots to locate and neutralize the device. The robots are equipped with cameras so that their operators can visualize the area in the robot's path, and navigate them from a safe distance. However, the robots' camera lenses were obscured because of thick smoke and water, and the robot operators could not see well enough to successfully navigate the robots. In

any case, the effort became moot due to intensifying fire conditions and a roof collapse, which led to the withdrawal of all interior personnel.

The fire entered a phase of drastic escalation, and fighting it became an external effort.

Resolution:

After emergency personnel were evacuated from the inside of the mall, fire department personnel fought the fire primarily by aerial master stream attack from ladder trucks positioned around the exterior of the affected area. Four fire divisions were assigned to distinct sectors of the fire scene, where operations continued through the night. Safety officers were assigned to each division and reported to an incident safety officer. Meanwhile, a unified command was formed between the fire and police departments. This resulted in a strategy to place interior hose lines into key areas to inhibit the spread of the fire while keeping firefighters a safe distance from explosive and collapse hazard zones.

By Oct. 22, the fire had been knocked down, hot spots mopped up and the area secured as a crime scene as requested by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF). However, fire operations continued on scene until Oct. 27 to maintain a fire watch and work with Westfield personnel to coordinate post-fire activities.

The Galleria was released back to owner Westfield Corporation on Oct. 27, when the last fire engine cleared the scene. Damage was extreme, with approximately 40 businesses directly affected. Total monetary losses have yet to be established. However, the Galleria was able to, in large part, reopen by the holiday season in areas that were less impacted by the fire or suppression operations.

Two firefighters reported receiving minor injuries.

The Galleria fire required effective coordination between fire and police decision makers in reaction to many, potentially fatal, and rapidly changing variables. The presence of a reported gunman with a suspected explosive device greatly aggravated an already complex and dynamic police and fire emergency situation. Either one of these components could easily have proved tragic, but combined, the possibility for injury to the public or to emergency personnel increased exponentially.

Operating in a rapidly changing situation, with limited information, police and fire personnel resolved the situation without serious injuries or loss of life. They safely detained the suspect and saved the majority of the mall property. While hindsight reveals lessons that will help improve future responses, it also demonstrates that these lessons would not necessarily have changed any outcomes in the Oct. 21 Galleria incident.

Lessons Learned:

As with any incident of nearly any size — especially one with as many different possible outcomes as the Westfield Galleria arson — several lessons have been identified that will lead to improved capabilities in future large-scale events combining fire department and law enforcement response.

These lessons are detailed in the conclusion of the below report, which has been compiled from police and fire department accounts.

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After Action Report: Oct. 21, 2010 Arson at Westfield Galleria at Roseville

At 10:22 a.m. on October 21, Roseville's public safety dispatchers were notified of an arson fire at the GameStop video games store, on the second floor of the Westfield Galleria at Roseville. They were told that a suspect had entered the store, mentioned a gun, displayed a backpack that smelled of kerosene, and barricaded himself inside the storage room to the rear of the store, where he started a fire.

According to logs, the sprinklers in the vicinity of the fire activated at 10:23 a.m.

At 10:24 a.m., a high level structure response, including three fire engines, two ladder trucks, two battalion chiefs and one private American Medical Response (AMR) ambulance were dispatched to the GameStop store. The initial report was that a subject had barricaded himself inside GameStop and was going to set it on fire. Roseville Police patrol officers were also dispatched at 10:24 a.m. and arrived on scene approximately six minutes later.

Dispatch quickly provided updated information that the suspect was possibly armed with a gun and was carrying a backpack that smelled like kerosene. Following the fire department's standard operating procedure for Operations at Potentially Violent Incidents (SOP 5.03.0600, Appendix A), all fire units and AMR were notified to stage in a safe location and acknowledged via radio that they heard the order.

Battalion 1 arrived with initial arriving units and staged on the east side of the Macy's parking structure as it provided a large space to stage fire apparatus out of the direct line of sight from the incident, yet provided close proximity to the affected area of the mall and would allow for quick deployment of resources when fire units were cleared by PD to enter the scene. Battalion 1 assumed Galleria Command (Fire Command), established the Incident Command Post (ICP), requested a Public Information Officer (PIO) and also a police commander to form a unified command structure.

Dispatch advised Fire Command of a water flow alarm in Zone 6, the area of the mall housing GameStop, which was on the second floor between Macy's and JC Penney's. Fire Command advised the PD that the sprinklers should hold the fire in check until fire department units could gain access, but for PD to expect smoke. It should be noted that fire sprinklers activate individually in the immediate area of a fire, and that the sprinklers outside the store, where the officers were standing, did not activate until later in the incident. The affected section of the mall was the original section built in 1999 and opened in 2000. The fire sprinkler system was designed in accordance with nationally recognized standards. Fire sprinkler coverage existed below the ceiling level, but there was no sprinkler coverage in the attic space, which is designed to include very little combustible material.

While PD was securing the perimeter and working on tactical law enforcement operations, FD deployed apparatus to support the fire sprinklers and fire pump. Fire prevention officers were assigned to the fire control room that housed the main fire alarm panel and smoke control system for the mall site, and the adjacent fire riser room that also housed the fire pump. The first arriving prevention officer found the fire pump off and he manually turned it on using the emergency override switch. Another prevention officer found the smoke control system was in the firefighter mode (manual activation required by fire department personnel) and not the automatic mode. He moved the switch to the automatic mode and the smoke control system for the affected zone turned on. An additional prevention officer was placed inside the Galleria security office to monitor interior video monitors for interior smoke conditions, as well as to monitor secondary fire alarm panels for the mall. Many of the communications between prevention officers and Fire Command were intentionally done via cell phone to ease traffic congestion on the radio.

During this time, PD had immediately set a perimeter just outside the store entrance, in the common area. A police Sergeant arrived and began to direct the operation. Several more officers began to arrive at the Galleria and helped establish perimeter positions to the rear of the store and provided less than lethal (bean bag shotgun) and rifle coverage to the front of the store. Two patrol officers met with the GameStop manager and UPS driver and ascertained more detailed information. The officers identified the presence of the suspect's bags as potential threats and warned the officers on scene to be aware that there could possibly be secondary devices still in the store. At 10:35 a.m., the sergeant requested the SWAT team be notified.

At approximately 10:44 a.m. a Roseville PD Lieutenant and Captain arrived and took over directing the operation. The Lieutenant established a Police Command Post (Police Command) on the second floor of the Galleria, a short distance away from the scene. The Police Captain was designated as the Incident Commander (IC). Galleria personnel, as well as FD personnel, also arrived at the Police Command Post, located inside the nearby Artifacts store.

At approximately 10:49 a.m., patrol officers began to expand the inner perimeter and search the adjacent stores. At approximately 10:57 a.m., the patrol Sergeant radioed a request for the ambient music in the mall be turned off so the officers could hear better.

The Tactical Commander (TC) of the Tri-City SWAT team, another Roseville Police Captain, as well as the Chief of Police arrived at the Police Command Post at approximately 11:00 a.m. to be briefed on the situation.

At 11 a.m., Galleria personnel made a public address announcement requesting the evacuation of the entire mall. Arriving police investigators assisted in walking the common areas to aid in the evacuation.

Between 11:12 and 11:35 a.m. members of the Tri-City SWAT team and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team arrived. The SWAT team relieved patrol units on the

inner perimeter, established snipers to observe the front of the store and deployed K9 units with two of their perimeter teams. The EOD team deployed a robot into the store, but was unsuccessful in finding either the bag or suitcase. Smoke and water from the overhead sprinklers eventually disabled the robot.

At the Fire Department Command Post, an incident action plan (IAP) was established for a two-division offensive fire attack that included one truck and two engines on each floor, to be deployed as soon as PD cleared fire staff to enter. At this point, Fire Command was expecting to find a manageable fire on the second floor of GameStop with major water damage on both floors from the sprinkler activation. Various positions within the Incident Command System (ICS) were filled as the incident escalated. Two additional fire engines and two additional AMR units and one AMR supervisor were requested as a contingency plan in case this became an active shooter incident. This included establishing a Multi-Casualty Incident (MCI) Branch, notifying Sutter Roseville Hospital, and having fire crews work closely with AMR personnel to set up tactical objectives. During this time there was occasional white, wispy smoke coming from the roof area over the northeast wing near GameStop.

At about 11:41 a.m., Fire Department personnel in the Galleria Fire Control Room heard a Westfield maintenance worker talking about having been told to shut off one of the fire sprinkler valves. In response to their direct question, he stated that the "police department" had told him to do so. Fire Department personnel told him that the sprinkler valve needed to be turned back on immediately, and initiated communications to accomplish that task. Within eight minutes, SWAT team members escorted the Westfield maintenance worker to the water valves to accomplish that task at 11:49 a.m.

It was later determined that the Westfield maintenance worker turned off the sprinklers to the GameStop store at 10:38 a.m. In later interviews, the maintenance worker said the request came from either a police officer or sheriff's deputy who was stationed outside the GameStop. However, no sheriff deputies were present at that time and no police officer made such a request. Subsequent interviews identified a UPS employee also telling a Westfield maintenance worker that the police wanted the sprinklers turned off, however neither the UPS worker nor the maintenance worker could recall or identify who initiated the request. The sprinklers remained off until Fire Command discovered the situation and immediately ordered them back on. Later review of sprinkler records would determine the sprinklers had been off for 71 minutes during the initial stages of the incident.

[It is important to note that the sprinklers had been on and functioning properly. The way sprinkler systems function is different from how movies have portrayed them as coming on all at once throughout a building.

Modern sprinkler systems allow for each sprinkler to activate individually when its heat-sensing device is triggered. Initially, the sprinklers did activate when the system detected a fire in that area, and that action was reported to Westfield's alarm company and the fire department. Water flow alarms rang on the exterior of the building and the

fire pump turned on as designed. The water from that event was evident with officers reporting water coming from the rear of the store.

So given the alarm company records showing the system had activated as expected and the water evidence, the sprinklers appeared to be functioning as they should. There was not an opportunity to obtain visual confirmation of the continued activation of the sprinkler head(s) because they were in the closed rear room of GameStop, where the suspect was barricaded, claiming he had a gun.]

As the fire continued to escalate, Fire Command established a fire command radio channel, in addition to the assigned tactical channel, and assigned Battalion 8 to fire operations section chief. Fire Command then met with police commanders inside the Artifacts Store to coordinate operations. Around 11:47 a.m., a column of light smoke was seen from behind JC Penney's and PD was reporting explosions heard inside GameStop.

As Fire Command entered the second floor of the Galleria from the Sears parking garage, thick black smoke was noted above the stores on the second floor, east wing of the mall. The sounds of gunfire were heard, which turned out to be SWAT officers unsuccessfully attempting to break out overhead skylights with a less-lethal device. Fire Command met with the police commanders inside the store briefly before both were forced to relocate as smoke started to fill the Police Command post. As personnel inside the Police Command post were moving to a safer location, the sprinkler valve had been reopened, as evidenced by a loud whooshing sound overhead, followed by an immediate release of steam pushing the smoke to the ground. Numerous sprinkler heads had now opened in the atrium area and other areas of the affected wing. Later review of the sprinkler reports would indicate the Zone 6 sprinkler valve remained off for approximately 71 minutes during the incident.

As the Police Command post was being moved to the upper parking lot outside of Sears, radio confirmation was made that the sprinkler valve for the west side of the mall was reopened by Galleria employees. This zone had been shut off earlier in the day for routine tenant improvement work and it was a priority to make sure this valve was opened in case the fire spread. Fire prevention officers confirmed that all valves in the Galleria Mall site were opened and all systems were operating, including the fire pump.

As the fire intensity increased, a second alarm local government strike team of five engines and a chief officer was requested at 11:51 a.m., along with a third alarm Task Force assignment from Sacramento Metro Fire with five engines, two trucks and several chief officers at 12:04 p.m. Later, one additional local government strike team was requested as the fourth alarm. Inside the security office the fire prevention officer who was monitoring surveillance cameras reported heavy smoke on the second floor of the affected wing.

At approximately 12:11 p.m., as smoke continued to increase, law enforcement apprehended the suspect as he was leaving a rear hallway that ran behind GameStop

and adjacent businesses. Safety concerns about entering the GameStop due to a secondary device remained and kept officers and fire fighters at bay. EOD officers continued to work on a way to safely enter and locate the bags left by the suspect.

Fire department units were preparing to make interior entry when a police commander advised Fire Command to keep fire units out of the building until they could sweep the area and confirm there were no additional suspects. A few seconds later, a PD tactical commander advised Fire Command that there was possibly a bomb inside. It was the first knowledge Fire Command had of a possible Improvised Explosive Device (IED) involved in the incident. Emergency traffic instructions were relayed to fire operations, advising that fire units were not clear for firefighting operations due to a possible bomb. All crews acknowledged. Fire Command conferred with Police Command about the credibility of the threat and if fire units could get some interior lines into the Galleria in a defensive, safe location to stop the fire from spreading. It was deemed unsafe by PD at this time for fire crews to enter. Fire department units remained outside the building, in accordance with SOP 6.02.0500 Response to Explosions or Incidents Involving Explosive Devices or Materials.

SWAT officers securing the inner perimeter were having difficulty with increasing smoke. PD requested self-contained-breathing-apparatus (SCBA's) for EOD personnel so they could accompany their robot inside to secure the IED and drag it out. This would then allow firefighters to get inside and fight the fire. Fire units designated as Division 2, were assigned to assist with the Placer County EOD operations and supplied hose lines while a remotely controlled robot entered at 12:26 p.m. Several attempts were made to access the possible IED, but were unsuccessful because the heavy smoke and water obscured the robot's camera lens, and the operators were not able to see well enough to navigate the robot.

Despite having the suspect in custody, the potential danger of a possible second suspect and an explosive device remained. At approximately 12:29 p.m., EOD and SWAT team members were given permission to enter; however due to the increased smoke they had to abort the plan. Since a bomb suit was equipped with a Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA), an EOD officer could go into the smoky environment, but the SWAT team members did not have SCBA, and therefore could not provide protection. At 12:32 p.m. a request was made to outside agencies for a tactical team with the ability to use SCBA.

At 12:33 p.m. a SWAT officer suggested cutting holes in several windows on the roof to try to ventilate smoke. They accomplished the task at approximately 12:57 p.m. but this action did not provide for adequate ventilation.

At approximately 1:05 p.m., the Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement (BNE) notified the IC it had a laboratory abatement team that was properly trained in the use of SCBA's and would respond.

Around 1:10 p.m., EOD requested the fire sprinklers be shut down temporarily, to improve visibility so that EOD robots could again go in and try to remove the IED. After several consultations weighing the logistics of shutting the sprinklers down temporarily, compared to the risk of not being able to remove the IED, the Unified Command coordinated a plan, (which was never enacted, for reasons to follow) to temporarily shut down the sprinklers for a short time to allow the robots to go in. Fire crews, along with a Westfield employee, attempted to make their way to the sprinkler valve but were unable to reach it due to untenably dangerous fire conditions. Neither the sprinklers nor fire pump were shut off at this time due to increasing fire activity. At about 1:50 p.m., a significant change in fire conditions was reported by Fire Command, with fire coming through the roof, and prevention officers reporting that numerous duct detectors had activated in the mall. (Duct detectors are smoke devices placed inside air handling ducts. When activated, they send out a supervisory signal to the alarm panel.) All law enforcement personnel and the fire crew that tried to access the valve were ordered from the building. It was confirmed that all law and fire personnel had complied and that all occupants had evacuated. This ended any operations to recover any suspected improvised explosive device.

The Fire Department began combating the fire from exterior positions, with elevated master streams from ladder trucks. Soon after, the Fire IC was informed that part of the roof near the GameStop location had collapsed. The EOD officers assessed the situation and believed that any device was likely rendered ineffective because of being exposed to the fire, copious water and a roof collapse.

Fire department operations deployed fire apparatus around the perimeter, and then divided the incident into new geographical divisions. Division Alpha was assigned the east wing of the mall that housed GameStop and other stores between Macy's and JC Penney's. Division Bravo was assigned the exposure group that covered the south half of the mall from the center corridor, housing the carousel, south to Nordstrom. Division Charlie covered Sears, the food court, and the west wing of the mall directly across from the GameStop. Division Delta was assigned Macy's department store. A safety officer was added to each division, all reporting to the assigned incident safety officer.

A Roseville Battalion Chief was flown over the fire in Metro Fire's Copter 1 and he provided aerial reconnaissance and direction of ladder truck aerial line placement to make sure ladder pipe discharge was hitting the targeted areas. He advised of a roof HVAC that was getting ready to collapse into the building. At some point there was a significant roof collapse over the main fire area on the second floor.

The Police's command moved to the Sears Automotive Center due to exterior smoke drifting over the previous site. The Police and Fire commanders developed a strategy to place interior hose lines into key areas to inhibit fire growth, yet keep fire personnel a safe distance from the hazard zone. An exposure branch was assigned to establish hose lines into Division Bravo to prevent fire spread into the unaffected areas of the mall. City water personnel were on scene and verified the water distribution system met the firefighting demands. Once the bulk of heat was knocked down by the ladder truck

elevated master streams, the aerial lines were shut down. A 100' long defensive trench cut was made in the roof south of GameStop and multiple 2 ½" hose lines were extended inside to confine the fire to the wing of origin. Caution was maintained to keep all firefighters out of the immediate hazard zone due to secondary collapse potential, the possible remnants of an IED and the fact that this was a crime scene.

Roseville building officials arrived, assessed the building and felt there was significant risk for collapse in the roof and atrium areas due to prolonged heat exposure and the weight of accumulated water. An interior collapse zone was established on the first and second floors of the east mall between Macy's and JC Penney's. This was relayed to all crews operating on the scene. City staff opened the city Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and handled additional logistical requests.

The Tri-City SWAT team remained as outer perimeter security until approximately 3:28 p.m., at which time they were relieved by Placer County's SWAT team. The Placer County SWAT team remained until further investigation and interviews with the suspect made it fairly clear that he acted alone. The SWAT team was replaced by Galleria security and the tactical portion of the operation was completed at approximately 5:48 p.m.

The Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms' National Response Team (NRT) agreed to take a lead role in the arson investigation and collection of evidence. Roseville Police Investigators along with Roseville Fire Department Arson Investigators assisted the ATF through the conclusion of their investigation. ATF provided a final investigatory report (excluding lab results). Any further investigation was to be done by the PD.

Objectives for fire operations for the first night included securing the hazard zone and preventing entry to the crime scene area, extinguishing hot spots, performing a primary and secondary search for any victims, water removal as possible and securing utilities by shutting off individual valves in each tenant space. These objectives were coordinated with Westfield personnel, including their security staff and PD. A representative from the ATF arrived and surveyed the scene. He confirmed he had activated the National Response Team (NRT) and the team of 20 agents would arrive the next day. ATF ordered the crime scene to be secured with strict perimeter control. No private vendors were allowed to start working on water removal, even in ancillary stores, until ATF approved the work at a later time.

Unified Command worked with the incident planning staff to develop a resource order request for the next operational period. The request was for a state Office of Emergency Services (OES) Type I USAR (Urban Search and Rescue) Task Force of 2 Heavy Rescues and 2 Medium Rescues, an OES strike team of five type 1 light rescue engines (Type III USAR), and four engines and two ladder trucks from Roseville Fire to arrive at 9:00 a.m. on October 22, 2010. A mutual aid command trailer arrived and the Unified Command now had increased communication capability as well as a private indoor meeting room for the command staff.

Throughout the night crews continued to work at the mall site and the City's emergency operations center. Public information officers released a statement that Westfield's Galleria Mall would be closed the next day. Commanders released crews from outside agencies that were no longer needed. Plans were made for public information and media contacts, staging, and logistics for the next operational period, and a morning briefing.

As fresh crews arrived on October 22, 2010, apparatus that had been committed over night were released. At 9:00 a.m. a briefing was held for the next operational period. Objectives included the USAR (Urban Search and Rescue) team shoring the first floor and second floor collapse area to make the scene safe for ATF to continue with the crime scene investigation. Other fire units continued to extinguish hot spots, remove water and assist with other assignments as directed. Governor Schwarzenegger proclaimed a State of Emergency in Placer County due to the fire, which required a commitment of resources from numerous agencies. The emergency proclamation paved the way to help compensate outside agencies, help pay for the local government response, and speed unemployment benefits for displaced Galleria workers.

On the third through sixth operational period (October 23 – October 26), two fire engines remained committed to the incident for 24-hour shifts. Fresh crews were rotated each day onto these two engines. Their objectives were to maintain a fire watch, extinguish hot spots, and work with Westfield personnel in numerous areas as assigned. On October 27, 2010 at 4:00 p.m., ATF held a briefing for fire and police commanders and they ruled the incident an act of arson. This briefing concluded the initial investigation portion of this incident. Around 6:00 p.m., the Galleria was released back to Westfield Corporation and the last fire engine cleared the scene.

Two firefighters filed injury reports for injuries received during the fire suppression effort, one requiring ambulance transport to Sutter Roseville, the other complaining of neck and back pain a few days after the incident.

Preliminary Damage Assessment

Initial reports were that approximately 40 businesses suffered significant damage, including tenant spaces inside the east mall corridor plus the smaller vendor booths located in the upper and lower level floors. The second level stores including GameStop, Finish Line, and Anchor Blue had severe damage from the fire plus structural damage from the overhead roof collapse. Adjacent tenants of FYE, Parallel, The Icing and Beauty by Thread had significant fire, smoke and water damage. The rated corridor between Anchor Blue and Parallel, along with trench ventilation and interior hose lines, did a good job confining most of the fire to the northeast side of the affected wing.

Tenants on the west side of the mall corridor had significant smoke and water damage. These tenants included: CitiWear, Mrs. Fields, Good Hand, Lane Bryant, The Gold Guys, Journey's and Pacific SunWear.

First level stores below the fire area had significant water damage with several inches of standing water reported after the fire was knocked down. Macy's had its exterior fire door closed and activation of six curtain wall sprinkler heads during the fire. Macy's had both water and smoke damage.

Sears had its fire doors closed but it had significant water damage on both floors. JC Penney's had its fire doors closed and it had water seepage into the lower and upper floors.

Built in Fire Protection System Review

The affected portion of the mall was the original section build in 1999 and opened in 2000. The automatic fire sprinkler system was installed according to nationally recognized standards. All public areas of the mall are protected by sprinklers and supplied by one electric fire pump. According to the sprinkler contractor, approximately 200 sprinklers were activated during the peak of the incident. It should be noted that sprinklers activate individually in the immediate vicinity of a fire, so during the first stage of the incident, only the sprinkler or sprinklers over the fire origin in the back room of GameStop would have activated. Other sprinklers activated as the fire spread.

Anchor tenants, including Macy's, Sears and Nordstrom have stand-alone sprinkler systems, not connected to the mall fire protection system. Nordstrom has an independent electric fire pump for its store, and neither its sprinklers nor fire pump had activated during the fire. Macy's and Sears curtain wall sprinklers were activated on the second floor in front of their fire doors due to high heat.

The electric fire pump was started by Roseville prevention officers immediately upon their arrival and the pump continued to run until power was shut off later in the afternoon at the request of the unified command due to risk of electrical shock to interior crews operating in several inches of water; the fire sprinkler system was supplemented with multiple fire engines supplying water through the fire department connection by-passing the inoperable fire pump.

The smoke control system in the fire control room was found in the firefighter mode upon arrival of fire prevention staff. Prevention staff switched it to the automatic mode and the air handling system operated as designed. It is unknown why the system was not in the automatic mode originally.

A Fire Prevention Officer in the security office was able to monitor security cameras and provide Fire Command with frequent updates on interior fire conditions. This provided invaluable information on the buildup of smoke near the upper level by Macy's. Unfortunately, the cameras did not rotate, so other critical information that could have

been useful was not accessible. Prevention officers reported the fire control panels were operating normally during the incident.

Summary and Lessons Learned

The City of Roseville experienced one of the most complex fire and police responses in its history. While the incident began as a commercial fire inside a store in the mall, it quickly grew in complexity to include a man reportedly with a gun inside the mall, which was on fire, and then ended with the threat of an IED as well. In this dynamic situation, fire and police commanders made strategic and tactical adjustments quickly to ensure safety for citizens as well as the public safety responders.

The potential threats in this incident—a reportedly armed suspect and a possible explosive device -- required firefighters to follow procedures and stage until the scene was cleared by PD. While staging, contingency plans were made for the rapidly changing incident, and crews prepared tactical plans to put into action when cleared.

For law enforcement, the Galleria incident came as close to a worst-case scenario as possible, with a report of an armed arsonist in possession of some type of incendiary or explosive device. Their coordinated effort resulted in the safe evacuation of a large regional shopping mall, the insertion of two full SWAT teams into an extremely hazardous situation and the apprehension of the suspect, all accomplished without any serious injury and no loss of life.

On review of large scale incidents, the lessons-learned section often identifies communication issues as a primary area for improvement. On the Galleria Incident, fire communications went well. There were few busy signals, or interrupted communications. Initial-arriving automatic aid companies already had FD portable radios in their apparatus. In accordance with the department's communication plan, later-arriving mutual aid companies were given radios from the cache carried in Roseville command vehicles. A communication leader was requested through the CalEMA Mutual Aid System and when the team arrived, its members continued to adjust the communication plan for the remainder of the incident. Most crews reported they knew who they were working for and their objectives, although they changed throughout the incident, were clear.

Once fire fighters were clear to fight the fire from the exterior using elevated streams from ladder trucks, crews went to work and quickly achieved their objectives. Due to the IED threat, there was a delay in allowing crews to work from an interior position. This delay followed department policy. The IED threat presented continued challenges related to how close fire crews could get to extinguish the fire, yet still maintain a safe distance until ATF ruled out the threat, and maintain the crime scene perimeter. Having a safety officer assigned to each fire division was pivotal in keeping all operations working from safe positions.

Roseville Fire Department Standard Operating Procedure 6.01.100 (Appendix C), RFD Fire Ground Operations, mandates the use of all aspects of the Incident Command System (ICS). The FD engages in ICS principles on daily emergency responses, training assignments and large scale responses. ICS was used from the beginning of the Galleria Incident until the very end. ICS positions were assigned and the span of control was kept in balance. The request for mutual aid went smoothly with no issues. Arriving apparatus checked in to staging and assignments came through appropriate chain of command. Twenty-seven engines, 11 trucks, and more than 12 chief officers were staged and deployed at this incident.

In the second operational period, the size and complexity of the work performed by the Urban Search and Rescue teams was exceptional. Crews worked in very high places, approximately 50 feet above ground, using 6"x6" 20' heavy timber to construct shoring in the first and second floor collapse areas. ATF was very complimentary of our local USAR response. During the ATF debrief, ATF leaders commented that the magnitude of assembling these large scale shores was beyond the work done at the Pentagon following the 9/11 attacks.

The areas identified for continued improvement include:

Timing of a Co-Located Command Post:

While police and fire commanders communicated and coordinated operations throughout the incident, communication would have been easier if the police and fire command posts had been co-located earlier in the incident.

Location of Police Incident Command Post:

To be strategic, the ICP should be set up once, in a safe location, which is accessible to all command staff. Moving the ICP distracts the commanders and confuses response personnel who are in need of checking in and receiving assignments at the ICP. The fire ICP became the final unified ICP early in the evening of October 21, 2010. This location provided ample parking for apparatus, staging and media, and the multi-level parking structure provided an area for crews to have meals and briefings under cover as the weather became inclement during several days of the incident.

Visual Identification of Key Personnel:

In a large-scale ICS incident, personnel may work in different roles than in their everyday work, and work with staff from many different outside agencies. For those reasons, personnel operating within the incident command system should wear orange vests that identify their mission critical roles so everyone is aware of the role they are playing.

Personal Protective Equipment:

One fire department member entered an Immediate Danger to Life and Health (IDLH) environment without wearing the appropriate Personal Protective Equipment (PPE).

Improved logistical support.

Areas for improvement in logistical support were identified, such as food and bathrooms for emergency personnel, and diesel fuel for refueling.

Self Contained Breathing Apparatus for SWAT

The Galleria incident identified the lack of any SWAT teams in the area capable of operating with self contained breathing apparatus (SCBAs). It was apparent that a smoky environment was a significant hindrance to tactical operations. Due to the cost, training time and the significant risk of using SCBA in a tactical environment, most teams do not possess or train with them. A more in depth analysis of this need should be initiated.

In conclusion, the response resulted in the safe capture of the suspect and saved the majority of the mall property with minimal injury and no loss of life. The above lessons will allow an opportunity for systematic improvement to future emergency responses in the Roseville area, and in mutual response to major emergency events in the Sacramento region.

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